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For Once, A Defense of Amtrak: Do Market 
Participants With Regulatory Authority 
Violate Due Process? 
Blayne Justus Yudis* 
The National Basketball Association (“NBA”) regulates 
American professional basketball. After acquiring the New 
Orleans Hornets in 2010, the NBA temporarily became both the 
league regulator and a franchise owner. As owner, the NBA 
vetoed a trade that would have sent the Hornets’s best player to 
another team. Was the NBA acting out of self-interest when it 
blocked the trade? In other words, was its trade block fair? 
Federal Courts have recently dealt with this issue in Association 
of American Railroads v. U.S. Department of Transportation. 
Following a decade of litigation, the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals decided that granting Amtrak regulatory authority 
violates due process because it is a self-interested market 
participant.  
This note argues that the D.C. Circuit’s decision to invalidate 
Amtrak’s regulatory power based on a finding of self-interest was 
error. The market history of private passenger rail service and 
 * Executive Editor, Volume 28 of the University of Miami Business Law Review; Juris
Doctor Candidate, University of Miami School of Law, 2020; Bachelor of Arts, Political
Science and Psychology, George Washington University, 2017. I thank Professor Charlton
Copeland for his passion for Administrative Law and Professor Sergio Campos for his
creative approach to analyzing tough issues. They both sparked my initial inspiration for
this note. I also thank Andrew Miller, Theo O’Brien, and UMBLR’s Executive Board and
Editorial Board for their diligence throughout this process. I give special thanks to my
family, especially my brother, Dylan Yudis, and my father, Scott Yudis, to whom I owe
everything. My accomplishments are possible because of their support for all my
aspirations. Finally, I thank my partner, Dr. Melanie Hussain. She continuously inspires
me to be the best version of myself. I cherish our mutual passion for intellectual discovery.
2019] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 221 
 
Amtrak’s statutory purpose demonstrate that Amtrak, like the 
NBA, serves to protect its industry, rather than compete against 
private participants. Public entities should not be exposed to 
judicial inquiries of self-interest. However, if they are, federal 
courts should adopt a more rigorous analysis than the one (or lack 
thereof) employed by the D.C. Circuit.  
Ultimately, the outcome in American Railroads is concerning 
because it exposes public regulatory bodies to constitutional 
challenges based on self-interest without regard to public or 
private status. Public regulators’ functionality and the public’s 
confidence in their neutral status is now at risk.  
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE NBA AND THE NEW ORLEANS HORNETS 
In the summer of 2010, the New Orleans Hornets’ All-Star point 
guard, Chris Paul, declared to ESPN that he was open to being traded if 
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the Hornets could not contend with elite teams.1 It is fairly common for 
superstar athletes to express frustration with their lackluster teams, but 
Paul’s wish came at an unusual time for the New Orleans Hornets and the 
NBA. 
The Hornets moved to New Orleans after problems began to develop 
for the team in Charlotte, North Carolina.2 Despite relative success in 
Charlotte, the Hornets’ attendance fell, its financial situation worsened, 
and an attempt to finance a new arena in Charlotte fell through.3 Following 
the move to New Orleans in 2002, the team experienced some success but 
failed to become a consistent playoff contender.4 Due to continued 
financial losses and poor attendance, longtime owner George Shinn 
unsuccessfully attempted to sell his stake in the franchise.5 Multi-
billionaire Larry Ellison claimed to have offered Shinn $350 million for 
the team, but Ellison could not match the winning bid.6 
In December of 2010, the NBA acquired the Hornets for $50 million 
less than Ellison’s offer.7 It seemed that the NBA was determined to take 
control of the franchise for months before the actual sale: there were 
reports that Ellison planned to move the battered franchise to San Jose, 
and the NBA had already made a big effort to keep the team in New 
Orleans after Hurricane Katrina hit a few years prior.8 In fact, before the 
NBA Board of Governors’ vote approving the sale, then-NBA 
Commissioner David Stern stated that the NBA’s purchase of the team 
“remain[ed] the best chance for the franchise to remain in [sic] New 
Orleans in the long term.”9 After approving the sale, the NBA owned one 
of its member franchises for the first time in league history.10 Yet other 
sports leagues’ acquisitions of their participating franchises had occurred 
in the past. The National Hockey League acquired the Phoenix Coyotes 
 
1  Ken Belson & Howard Beck, Debt Escalating, Hornets Are Purchased by N.B.A., 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2010), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/07/sports/basketball/07hornets.html. 
2 See id. 
3 Id. 
4 See id. 
5 Id. at 1. 
6 Dashiell Bennett, Larry Ellison Confirms He Tried to Buy the New Orleans Hornets, 





9 Belson & Beck, supra note 1. 
10 NBA planning to buy out Hornets owner, ESPN (Dec. 7, 2010), 
http://www.espn.com/nba/news/story?id=5892227.  
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and Major League Baseball owned the Montreal Expos for several years 
before moving the team to Washington.11  
The NBA’s acquisition, however, was different. It started when the 
NBA stated in response to criticism of the acquisition that it would not 
review the Hornets’ “franchise-altering decisions.”12 But following 
another disappointing season, the Hornets constructed a multi-team trade 
that would have sent Paul to the Lakers—certainly a franchise-altering 
decision.13 Commissioner Stern then stunned the league by vetoing the 
trade.14 He issued a statement asserting that he made the decision “to 
protect the interests of the Hornets” because “all decisions [would be] 
made on the basis of what is in the best interests” of the team.15  
The shock in response to the NBA’s veto of a trade between two teams 
is rooted in a principle of fairness: one competitor acting in self-interest 
should not wield regulatory authority over other competitors in the same 
market.16 The NBA sets rules and regulations that bind each member 
franchise.17 This authority makes the NBA the regulator of a specific 
market in which franchises, acting as self-interested competitors, directly 
compete with each other for championships, talent, and market share. So, 
why was the NBA—regulator and owner—allowed to veto Chris Paul’s 
trade to the Lakers? This issue was recently explored in federal court. 
In Association of American Railroads v. U.S. Department of 
Transportation, a federal court prohibited Amtrak from using its 
statutorily delegated regulatory power.18 This note examines the question 
explored in this litigation: is a market participant’s regulatory authority 
inherently unfair?19 Federal courts have conclusively held regulatory 
 
11 Belson & Beck, supra note 1. 
12 See id. 




16 See infra p. 18 and note 104. 
17 NBA Board of Governors approves rule changes for 2018-19 season, NBA 
COMMUNICATIONS (Sept. 21, 2018), http://pr.nba.com/nba-board-of-governors-approves-
rules-changes-for-2018-19-season/. 
18 See generally Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. Dep’t of Transp., No. 11-1499 (JEB), 2017 WL 
6209642, (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2017) (declaring Section 207 of the Passenger Rail Investment 
and Improvement Act of 2008 void and unconstitutional because it gives Amtrak—a 
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authority under these circumstances inherently unfair under the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.20 
This note’s central assertion is that market participants’ regulatory 
authority is not inherently unfair. An examination of Amtrak’s statutory 
purpose and the market history of American passenger rail service refutes 
the notion that Amtrak acts in self-interest. Instead, Amtrak acts to ensure 
the continued vitality of the rail passenger service industry, much like the 
NBA acts to protect and maintain the competitiveness of the league.21  
Part II of this note examines the history of rail passenger service in 
America in order to understand Amtrak’s purpose.22 Part III details: (a) the 
statutory overhaul to Amtrak’s regulatory structure brought on by the 
Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (“The 2008 Rail 
Act”);23 and (b) the American Railroads litigation, which has been coined 
a “legal donnybrook”24 between Amtrak and the private freight operators 
as a result of the 2008 Rail Act. Part IV argues that Amtrak is not self-
interested nor does it compete with freight operators. At a minimum, the 
Supreme Court should have reviewed American Railroads and engaged in 
a broader inquiry into Amtrak’s purported self-interest than the inquiry 
initiated by the D.C. Circuit.25 Part V concludes that the outcome of the 
American Railroads saga is wrong, despite Amtrak’s historically poor 
performance. Now that the Supreme Court has denied certiorari, other 
public entities may now be exposed to constitutional due process claims 
challenging their authority to regulate.  
 
20 Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. Dep’t of Transp., 896 F.3d 539 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (affirming the 
district court’s constitutional holding but limiting the extent of the constitutional violation 
so as to invalidate only one provision of Section 207 of the Passenger Rail Investment and 
Improvement Act of 2008), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 2665 (2019). Going forward, I will only 
use the shorthand “American Railroads” within the text to refer to the D.C. Circuit’s 2018 
decision. 
21 I acknowledge the distinction between the NBA, a private entity, and Amtrak, a public 
entity. However, this analogy is valid to the extent that the NBA’s regulatory motives—
like Amtrak—underlying its acquisition of the Hornets does not evidence self-interested, 
competitive behavior. See discussion supra pp. 2-3. Yet the public/private distinction is 
important to the legal question of fairness under Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
See discussion infra Section IV.B.  
22 Amtrak was created by statutory authorization in 1970. Rail Passenger Act of 1970, 
Pub. L. No. 91-518, § 301, 84 Stat. 1330. 
23 Pub. L. No. 110-432, 122 Stat. 4848 § 207(a) (2008). 
24 Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 896 F.3d at 541. 
25 See infra p. 21.  
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II. REGULATORY ENTITIES’  MARKET PARTICIPATION IS NOT 
ALWAYS MOTIVATED BY SELF-INTEREST: MARKET HISTORY AND 
STATUTORY PURPOSE 
 
Oftentimes, debt-laden owners of sports franchises force their teams 
into bankruptcy, leading to months of “awkard financial revelations and 
courtroom showdowns.”26 In December of 2010, it was likely that the 
NBA was well-aware of the bad publicity associated with financially 
struggling franchises and how that could lead to franchises being sold at 
discounted prices.27 By buying the Hornets, the NBA could avoid exposing 
the franchise to bad publicity, possible relocation, and discounted sales 
prices.28 So, the NBA purchased the team because the value of keeping the 
Hornets in New Orleans was greater to the team—and the NBA—than 
Ellison’s purported offer.29 Moreover, Stern rejected the Chris Paul trade 
so that the franchise could remain competitive in New Orleans.30 The 
NBA’s actions and Stern’s comments demonstrate that the NBA acquired 
the Hornets and rejected the Chris Paul trade for the benefit of the league 
as a whole, not out of self-interest. 
Like the NBA, other regulatory entities may enter a market to maintain 
the viability of one competitor for the benefit of the entire market. 
A. Rail Passenger Service in America From 1900-1970   
In 1900, major railroad executives were celebrities.31 Feuled by 
techonological developments that led to improvements in track and 
equipment, the railroads helped link the country from east coast to west 
coast.32 By the turn of the century, American railroading had reached its 
“zenith”: a traveler on a first-class train at that time could expect to find 
“good food, a library, a barber shop, and the company of prominent 
 
26 See supra note 1. 
27 Earlier in 2010, retired Hall-of-Famer Michael Jordan purchased the Charlotte 
Bobcats for $25 million less than the amount previous owner Robert L. Johnson paid for 
the franchise in 2002 due to bad publicity. Id. 
28 Id.  
29 Responding to rumors that a private investor would buy the team and relocate it, Stern 
said that the league’s purchase of the team was the best chance of keeping the Hornets in 
New Orleans “in the long term.” Id.  
30 Id. 
31 DAVID C. NICE, AMTRAK: THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF A NATIONAL RAILROAD 1, 1 
(JAMES J. GOSLING ET AL. EDS., 1998). 
32 Id. 
 
226 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:220 
 
individuals from the worlds of business, politics, and entertainment.”33 To 
contemporaries, the railroad was “an institution.”34 
In fact, the institution was flush with cash. Between 1901 and 1905, 
Pennsylvania Railroad had purchased more than $110 million35 worth of 
stocks and acquisitions in competing lines. The rail passenger train 
industry “appeared to occupy a secure place in society,” or so it seemed.36  
Following a peak in 1916 of U.S. railroad expansion, the U.S. Railroad 
Administration nationalized the railroads in response to America’s entry 
into World War I.37 By the time the government relinguished control back 
to the private operators, the railroads’ physical plants had deteriorated 
considerably.38 Beginning in the 1920s, the railroads began to experience 
a long-term decline in passenger train service through the 1960s. In the 
late 1920s, the United States had approximately 20,000 passenger trains 
in service and more than 200,000 miles of passenger train routes.39 By 
1966, that figure had reduced by more than two-thirds,40 and by 1970 only 
450 passenger trains remained in service.41 Additionally, passenger 
volume dramatically declined: the number of passenger miles traveled by 
train fell by nearly 80 percent from 1920 to 1970.42 
The decline in U.S. passenger rail service occurred for various 
reasons. As early as the late 1930s, passenger train companies were losing 
more than $200 million annually, and after World War II those losses 
increased to more than $700 million in 1957.43 Of course, few private-
sector markets can endure financial losses of that magnitude for very long, 
let alone forty years.44  
Technological improvements in automobile design and highway 
engingeering gave automobile travel a “convenience and flexibility” that 
railroads were unable to match, such that passenger trains represented an 
 
33 JOSEPH R. DAUGHEN & PETER BINZEN, THE WRECK OF THE PENN CENTRAL 43 (1971); 
Nice, supra note 31. 
34 DAUGHEN & BINZEN, supra note 33. 
35 See CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., 
https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2019) (the 1905 
figure is equivalent to $3.064 billion in 2017 purchasing power based upon an average 
annual inflation rate of 3.02% per year during 1905–2017).  
36 NICE, supra note 31, at 2. 
37 DAUGHEN & BINZEN, supra note 33, at 44. 
38 Id. 
39 NICE, supra note 31, at 2. 
40 Id. (citing PATRICK DORIN, AMTRAK TRAINS AND TRAVEL 8 (1st ed. 1979)). 
41 Of the remaining 450 in service, roughly 100 of them were in the process of being 
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“outmoded technology” by the early 1970s.45 More importantly, the 
improvements in rival transporation industries were supported by public 
subsidies that were absent in the railroad industry. According to one 
estimate, national, state, and local governments contributed net subsidies 
of approximately $150 billion for highways and $40 billion for air travel 
between 1920 and 1978.46 Due to superior convenience and public funding 
of rival modes of transporation, it was evident that passenger rail service 
would not survive as a private market in America for much longer.  
B. The Fall of a Titan: The Penn Central 
By the 1960s, as railroad executives grew increasingly unwilling to 
bear financial losses, it seemed that passenger rail service’s death was 
imminent.47 Citizens and officials began to express alarm over the 
problems that might result from excessive reliance on road and air 
transportation.48 Although some analysts argued that the decline of 
passenger rail service was simply the natural result of market forces, others 
were alarmed at “the prospect of a nation without passenger trains.”49 It 
was presciently argued that total reliance on road and air transportation 
posed environmental problems because both require enormous amounts of 
land for roads, airports, parking, and service facilities.50 Another argument 
viewed rail service as critical to national security.51  
Yet private passenger rail service’s demise was inevitable. From 1961 
to 1966 annual passenger train losses stabilized at just under $400 million 
per year.52 Then, in 1967, the U.S. Post Office decided to remove virtually 
all first-class mail from passenger trains, and losses jumped to over $460 
million.53 Pennsylvania Railroad and New York Central responded by 
 
45 Id. at 3. 
46 Id. (citing DORIN, supra note 40, at 11). 
47 Id. at 5, 8. Based on the frank comments of one railroad executive, it was evident that 
the industry was intentionally trying to drive passengers away: “God damn all passengers 
on a short haul, anyway . . . if . . . I have to carry passengers I’ll make it so uncomfortable, 
inconvenient, and disagreeable for them that they’d wish they never bought a two-bit 
ticket.” Id. at 5 (citing LUCIUS BEEBE, MIXED TRAIN DAILY 59 (4th ed. 1961)). 
48 NICE, supra note 31, at 8. 
49 Id. at 7. 
50 Id.  
51 According to David Nice, this view was rooted in the intersection of transportation 
and national security. Id. (“During World War II, U.S. railroads demonstrated an 
impressive ability to move huge quantities of freight and passengers with comparatively 
limited resources . . . . Relying increasingly on road and air transportation, the United States 
has committed itself to a nearly total dependence on oil, in huge volumes, for both 
passenger and freight transportation.”).  
 
52 Id. at 4.  
53 Id.  
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merging to create The Penn Central Transportation Company (commonly 
known as “Penn Central”) on February 1, 1968.54 This venture lasted for 
871 days.55 On June 21, 1970, Penn Central went broke in what was at the 
time the largest bankruptcy filing in the history of the United States.56 It 
was cataclysmic:  
This single bankruptcy caused the nation and its business 
and political leaders to take a fresh look, not only at 
railroads, but at mergers in general and, more importantly, 
at the future of the country’s transportation industry. The 
collapse of the Penn Central raised questions about 
conglomerates and diversification programs; about the 
role of boards of directors and how they function, or fail 
to function; about the inherent conflicts of interest that 
arise as a result of incestuous, interlocking directorates 
between financiers who supply money, managers who 
borrow money, and brokers who traffic with both; about 
the relationship between big government and big 
business. And about the condition of American 
capitalism.57  
 
On July 22, 1970, four trustees were appointed to recruit new 
management to operate Penn Central’s $4.5 billion complex.58 At the time 
it went broke, the Penn Central’s long-term debt obligations totaled $2.6 
billion, almost $1 billion of which was due to creditors by 1974.59 
Following the fall of the Penn Central, the passenger rail service market 
was in disarray, but help was on its way.  
C. The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 
Initial pleas to the government called for public subsidies for 
passenger rail service, supplemented with a publicly-owned pool of 
passenger equipment to help meet operating costs and capital costs.60 The 
Nixon Administration, however, was concerned that an “outright subsidy 
to private firms could lead to a never-ending financial commitment that 
 
54 DAUGHEN & BINZEN, supra note 33, at 3–6. 
55 Id. at 12.  
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 13. 
59 Id. at 62 n.4. 
 
60 NICE, supra note 31, at 8. 
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might escalate enormously over time.”61 In response, the Department of 
Transportation called for creating a semipublic corporation, Railpax, 
which would operate passenger trains with modest public funding.62 That 
proposal was enacted by Congress, and President Nixon signed the 
legislation into law on October 30, 1970,63 in part because it offered lower 
costs to the federal government than a direct subsidy program.64  
In its authorizing statute, Railpax was renamed “Amtrak” and was 
given contradictory objectives: it was mandated to make a profit, but also 
required to maintain nationwide service, which required continued use of 
unprofitable routes.65 Both objectives likely reflected lingering issues that 
afflicted private passenger rail service. Amtrak’s profit requirement likely 
stemmed from the conflict of interest arising out of the “incestuous, 
interlocking directorates” of the private railroad companies.66 Due to these 
conflicts of interest, Penn Central only had $13.3 million in cash on the 
day of its merger,67 despite owning real property in New York City valued 
at more than $400 million in 1970.68 Additionally, Amtrak’s requirement 
to maintain nationwide service was likely a response to the policy of the 
private railroad companies, that seemed bent on actively driving 
passengers away from service.69 
Despite its contradictory objectives, the 1970 law gave Amtrak broad 
authority to “own, manage, operate, or contract for the operation of 
intercity trains”70 in order to “fully develop the potential of modern rail 




62 Id.  
63 NICE, supra note 31, at 9. 
64 Id. (citing Oliver Jensen, American Heritage History of Railroads In America 289 
(1975)). 
65 Id.  
66 DAUGHEN & BINZEN, supra note 33, at 12. 
67 Id. at 206. 
68 Id. at 16. 
69 See NICE, supra note 31, at 5 (“Some of the railroads did little to advertise their 
services. They seemed to be trying to drive passengers away.”). 
70 Amtrak’s broad authority can be traced at least in part to the trend of Congress at the 
time, which sought to create federal agencies aimed at combating broad public issues. See 
GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 334 (West Acad. Publ’g, 7th ed. (2016)); 
23 U.S.C. § 401 (1970); 84 Stat. 2086 (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 2051 (1973); 26 U.S.C. § 651 
(1970) (within six years, Congress created the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (1966), the Environmental Protection Agency (1970), the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (1970), and the Consumer Product Safety Commission 
(1972)). 
71 84 STAT. 1330, 1332 (1970). 
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Congress recognized that Amtrak—out of necessity—would have to 
rely on track systems owned by the private railroads in order to perform 
its operations.72 So, Congress required the private railroads to allow 
Amtrak to use their tracks and facilities at mutually-agreed upon rates as 
a condition of relief from the private railroads’ common-carrier duties.73 
Crucially, Amtrak’s passenger rail service was granted “preference over 
[private] freight transportation in using a rail line, junction or crossing.”74 
Affected private rail carriers, however, were granted a right to seek relief 
from Amtrak’s preference over the tracks.75  
In order to effectuate Amtrak’s statutory preference, Congress 
authorized Amtrak to make agreements with the private rail carriers and 
regional transportation authorities to “use facilities of, and have services 
provided by, the carrier or authority on which the parties agree.”76 If the 
parties could not come to an agreement on terms, Congress authorized the 
Surface Transporation Board to order that facilities be made available and 
“proscribe reasonable terms and compensation for using the facilities and 
providing the services.”77  
III. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS V. U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION 
A. Amtrak Acquires Regulatory Authority: The 2008 Rail Act 
Since Congress’ creation of Amtrak nearly fifty years ago, Amtrak has 
been constantly criticized for policy decisions, alleged mismangement of 
public subsidies, and has faced challenges that threaten its existence.78 
Much of this criticism stems from the flawed system baked in to Amtrak’s 
statutory framework. Specifcially, the private freight operators are 
required to share their tracks with Amtrak, which inherently poses 
challenges because it pits Amtrak and the private freight operators in a 
vicious cycle. Freight railroads are reluctant to sideline their slower-
moving trains to let Amtrak’s passenger trains pass because keeping their 
 
72 Ass’n of American R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 135 S.Ct. 1225, 1229 (2015). 
73 Id. (citing 45 U.S.C. §§ 561, 562 (1970 ed.)). 
74 49 U.S.C. § 24308(c) (2015).  
75 Id. 
76 49 U.S.C. § 24308(a)(1) (2015). 
77 Id. 
78 See generally JOSEPH VRANICH, END OF THE LINE: THE FAILURE OF AMTRAK REFORM 
AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA’S PASSENGER TRAINS 10-11 (2004) (describing, among other 
missteps, Amtrak’s particular mistakes over the years as “bowing to political pressure” in 
adding failed routes and Amtrak’s “insensitiv[ity]” to the changing preferences for modes 
of transportation). 
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own timetables is taking on “increasing importance” in the  shipping 
business.79 So when the private freight operators do no let Amtrak’s trains 
pass, Amtrak officials complain that their own notoriously unreliable 
trains are delayed because there is no enforcement of the federal law that 
gives Amtrak rail precedence over the freight operators.80 As the two 
parties go back and forth on who is to blame, passengers are left wondering 
why their trains are delayed for hours at a time.81 
After years of calls for reform, a train collision in 2008 prompted 
Congress to respond.82 Concerned by poor service, unreliability, and 
delays resulting from freight traffic congestion, Congress passed the 
Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act in 2008.83  
The 2008 Rail Act tried to break the viciuous cylce between Amtrak 
and the  private freight operators resulting from the original 1970 deal. The 
2008 Rail Act “jointly” granted Amtrak and the Federal Railroad 
Administration (“FRA”) authority to “develop new or improve existing 
metrics and standards for measuring the performance and service quality 
of intercity passenger train operations” in consultation with the private 
freight operators.84 If metrics and standards could not be developed within 
180 days, the law authorized “any party involved” to petition the Surface 
Transporation Board to appoint an arbitrator to assist the parties through 
binding arbitration.85 Once metrics and standards were promulgated, the 
law provided that, “[t]o the extent practicable, Amtrak and its host rail 
carriers [the private freight operators] shall incorporate the metrics and 
standards developed under subsection (a) into their access and service 
agreements.”86  
 
79 See Ted Mann, Train War Goes Off the Rail – And Onto Twitter, WALL STREET J., 
(Mar. 17, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amtrak-and-freight-railroad-clash-over-
tweets-and-train-delays-11552836755. 
80 This back-and-forth has led Amtrak to take to Twitter to tells riders when trains are 
delayed because they are stuck behind freight trains. In response, the private freight 
operators have threatened a lawsuit. See id. 
81 See id. 
82 Ashley Halsey III, Ten years after crash that pushed Congress to mandate life-saving 





83 Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-432, 122 
Stat. 4907; Ass’n of American R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 135 S.Ct. 1225, 1229 (2015) 
(citing Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-432, § 
207(a), 122 Stat. 4907, 4916). 
84 Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act § 207(a).  
85 Id. § 207(d). 
86 Id. § 207(c). 
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B. The Legal Donnybrook: Lead Up to the Due Process 
Challenge  
In March 2009, Amtrak and the FRA invited public comment on 
proposed metrics and standards pursuant to the 2008 Rail Act.87 The 
Association of American Railroads (“AAR”), an industry trade group 
representing the major private freight railroads, derided the measures 
because it claimed that certain aspects of the proposal would create an 
“excessive administrative and financial burden [on the freight 
operators].”88 The AAR and its members submitted comments concerning 
the increased expenses associated with expanding and maintaining the 
needed track capacity required by the proposal, which they would be 
required to account for in subsequent agreements with Amtrak over shared 
rail-use.89 Despite these concerns, the final version of the metrics and 
standards were issued in May 2010 without significant change.90 
AAR responded by filing suit in federal district court in Washington, 
D.C.91 The trade group argued that Section 207 of the 2008 Rail Act was 
unconstitutional for two reasons: (1) Section 207 violates the 
nondelegation doctrine by placing legislative and rulemaking authority in 
the hands of a private entity (Amtrak) that participates in the industry it 
atempts to regulate; and (2) Section 207 violates the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause by vesting government power in Amtrak, an 
“interested private party.”92 
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that Section 207 unconstitutionally 
delegated authority to Amtrak because it is a private entity.93 The Supreme 
Court, however, vacated this ruling and held that Amtrak acted as a public 
entity in jointly issuing metrics and standards with the FRA, thereby 
 
87 Ass’n of American R.Rs v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(citing Metrics and Standards for Intercity Passenger Rail Service Under Section 207 of 
Public Law 110-432, 74 Fed.Reg. 10,983 (Mar. 13, 2009)). The standards address 
Amtrak’s financial performance, consumer satisfaction surveys, and the percentage of 
passenger trips to and from underserved communities. See Ass’n of American R.Rs. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Transp., 135 S.Ct. 1225, 1230 (2015). 
88 Ass’n of American R.Rs., 721 F.3d at 670. 
89 Id. at 669–670 (citing Metrics and Standards for Intercity Passenger Rail Service 
Under Section 207 of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008, 75 
Fed. Reg. 26,839 (May 11, 2010)). 
90 Ass’n of American R.Rs., 135 S.Ct. at 1230. 
91 Ass’n of American R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 896 F.3d 539, 542–43 (D.C. Cir. 
2018). 
92 Ass’n of American R.Rs., 135 S.Ct. at 1230 (emphasis added). 
93 Ass’n of American R.Rs., 896 F.3d at 543 (citing Ass’n of American R.Rs. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 668 (D.C. Cir. 2013)).  
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resolving the nondelegation challenge.94 The Supreme Court then 
remanded the case back to the D.C. Circuit to address the due process 
challenge. 
C. A “Neat” Syllogism  
On remand, the D.C. Circuit held that Section 207 was also 
unconstitutional because the authority it delegated to Amtrak violated the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The D.C. Circuit fit their 
argument into a seemingly neat syllogism: 
We agree with the freight operators. Our view of this case 
can be reduced to a neat syllogism: if giving a self-
interested entity regulatory authority over its competitors 
violates due process (major premise); and [Section 207] 
gives a self-interested entity regulatory authority over its 
comeptitors (minor premise); then [Section 207] violates 
due process.95  
To satisfy the minor premise, the D.C. Circuit concluded that Amtrak 
is an “economically self-interested actor”96 because it “competes [with 
freight railroads] for scarce resources (train track) essential to the 
operation of both kinds of rail service.”97 Notably, the D.C. Circuit 
reasoned that Amtrak could still be “economically self-interested”98 even 
though the Supreme Court declared that Amtrak was a public entity for 
delegation purposes.99 The D.C. Circuit analyzed Amtrak’s statutory 
obligations “to be operated and managed as a for-profit corporation”,100 to 
make agreements “designed to maximize its revenues and minimize 
Government subsidies”,101 and other financial incentives built into its 
statutory scheme. Based on these provisions, the D.C. Circuit concluded 
that Amtrak’s economic self-interest is “undeniable.”102  
Due to Amtrak’s self-interest, the D.C. Circuit held that Section 207’s 
delegation of regulatory authority to Amtrak violated “one theme above 
 
94 Ass’n of American R.Rs., 135 S.Ct. at 1232–33 (“Amtrak was created by the 
Government, is controlled by the Government, and operates for the Government’s 
benefit.”). 
95 Ass’n of American R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 821 F.3d 19, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2016).  
96 Id. at 23. 
97 Id. at 23 n.1. 
98 Ass’n of American R.Rs., 821 F.3d at 32.  
99 This conclusion implies that public entites can act with economic self-interest. See 
discussion infra Section IV, pp. 20–21. 
100 49 U.S.C. § 24301(a)(2) (2012). 
101 Id. § 24101(d). 
102 Ass’n of American R.Rs., 821 F.3d at 32.  
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all others [that] has dominated the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Due Process Clause: fairness.”103 This theme is explained in the Carter 
Coal private delegation doctrine:  
The difference between producing coal and regulating its 
producton is, of course, fundamental. The former is a 
private activity; the latter is necessarily a governmental 
function . . . [because] one person may not be intrusted 
with the power to regulate the business of another, and 
especially of a competitor. And a statute which attempts 
to confer such power undertakes an intolerable and 
unconstitiutional interference with personal liberty and 
private property. The delegation is so clearly arbitrary, 
and so clearly a denial of rights safeguarded by the due 
process clause of the Fifth Amendment, that it is 
unnecessary to do more than refer to decisions of this 
court which foreclose the question.104 
Based on the Carter Coal fairness principle, the D.C. Ciruit held that 
it was not fair for Amtrak, an economically self-interested entity, to 
exercise regulatory authority over the private freight operators.105 
The extent of the constitutional violation was initially determined in 
the District Court for the District of Columbia,106 which chose to reject the 
argument that severing Section 207(d)’s arbitration provision alone would 
remedy the constitutional violation. Instead, the district court struck down 
Section 207’s entire statutory scheme—including both Amtrak’s joint 
authority to promulgate metrics and standards and the binding arbitration 
provision.107  
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit walked back the district court’s order by 
severing only the arbitration provision and upholding the validity of the 
rest of the statute.108 In support, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that the 
Constitution would not prohibit Amtrak from “exercising some measure 
of joint control with a disinterested governmental agency, as long as that 
other agency’s duty to protect the ‘public good’ could check Amtrak’s 
 
103 Id. at 27. 
104 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (citing Schechter Poultry Corp. 
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935)); see also Washington ex rel. Seattle Trust Co. 
v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121 (1928); Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 143 (1912). 
105 Ass’n of American R.Rs., 821 F.3d at 31. 
106 Ass’n of American R.Rs. v. Dep’t of Transp., 896 F.3d 539, 544 (D.C. Cir. 2018).  
 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 551. 
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self-interest and prevent unfair harm to its competitors.”109 Because 
Section 207(d) allows Amtrak—on its own—to request the appointment 
of a Surface Transportation Board arbitrator,110 the arbitrator could bind 
all parties to final metrics and standards over the objections of the private 
freight operators and the Surface Transporation Board.111 Therefore, the 
“straw that broke the camel’s back” was the binding arbitration provision 
because it stripped the FRA of the independent ability to prevent Amtrak 
from promulgating measures that promoted its own self-interest.112  
IV. A BROADER SELF-INTEREST INQUIRY OR PUBLIC/PRIVATE 
STATUS 
 
The American Railroads litigation ended with more questions than 
answers. What about the challenged delegation of regulatory power 
triggers a due process violation?113 Must Congress merely delegate 
authority to a private entity, whose self-interest is implied, or must 
authority be given to an entity, either of public or private, whose self-
interest is demonstrated in fact?114  
In Carter Coal, the Supreme Court held that the private body’s 
delegated authority violated due process, but the Court also presumed that 
official bodies are disinterested.115 The D.C. Circuit’s 2016 decision 
destroyed that presumption when it concluded that Amtrak is self-
 
109 Id. at 545 (quoting Ass’n of American R.Rs., 821 F.3d at 29 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). 
110 See supra note 85. 
111 Ass’n of American R.Rs., 896 F.3d at 545 (citing Ass’n of American R.Rs. v. Dep’t of 
Transp., 821 F.3d 19, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). 
112 Id.  
113 These questions, in part, can also be attributed to Carter Coal’s confusing nature. See 
Alexander Volokh, The New Private-Regulation Skpeticism: Due Process, Non-
Delegation, and Antritrust Challenges, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 931, 973 (2014) 
(explaining that whether the D.C. Circuit was correct on an issue in an earlier stage of the 
American Railroads litigation depends in large part on whether Carter Coal is categorized 
as a delegation case or a due process case (or both)). 
114 Nondelegation challenges can be categorized into two different types. The public 
nondelegation doctrine relies on the concept of separation of powers as a check on 
Congress from making standardless delegations to administrative agencies, whereas the 
private nondelegation doctrine “sounds more in the Due Process Clause” because 
delegating power to members of an industry to regulate their competitors “lacks the 
neutrality due process demands.” See A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: 
Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 153 (2000). 
115 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (“This is legislative delegation in 
its most obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an official or an official body, 
presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may be and often are 
adverse to the interests of others in the same business.”) (emphasis added). 
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interested despite its public status.116 Only once, in Carter Coal ,117 had 
the Supreme Court confronted a private delegation challenge on due 
process grounds, but the D.C. Circuit decided to extend the Carter Coal 
principle because it underwent an analysis of self-interest, despite 
Amtrak’s public status.118 Instead, the D.C. Circuit could have upheld 
Amtrak’s regulatory authority based on its public status, which carries 
with it a presumption of disinterest under Carter Coal.  
This section addresses the following two issues: (A) if courts are going 
to inquire into whether an entity is “self-interested” for legal purposes, that 
inquiry should be more rigorous than the inquiry engaged in by the D.C. 
Circuit Court in its 2016 decision; and (B) if the entity is public, private 
delegation challenges to its regulatory authority should be precluded by 
virtue of its public status and not analyzed for badges of self-interest.  
A. An Incomplete Self-Interest Inquiry: Amtrak is Not Self-
Interested and Does Not Compete With Freight Operators 
Even if the D.C. Circuit’s choice to engage in an analysis of Amtrak’s 
self-interest  was valid, its conclusion was misguided. The court primarily 
cited Amtrak’s for-profit obligation to maximize revenues and minimize 
government subsidies as support for Amtrak’s self-interest.119 However, 
market history for the passenger rail industry suggests that the purpose of 
Amtrak’s for-profit obligation was to avoid devastating the industry with 
bankruptcy.120  
Before 1970, Penn Central had a dangerously low amount of cash on-
hand despite its massive amount of assets.121 Combined with a good-faith 
obligation,122 Amtrak’s for-profit obligation was likely created to ensure 
 
116 See Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. Dep’t of Transp., 821 F.3d 19, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
117 Id. (“The abstract legal question at the heart of this case is whether it violates due 
process for Congress to give a self-interested entity rulemaking authority over its 
competitors. The Supreme Court has confronted the question only once [in Carter Coal].”). 
118 Id. at 32. 
119 Id. 
120 See discussion supra Section II. 
121 See DAUGHEN & BINZEN, supra note 33, at 12, 206-07 (“[Penn Central’s holdings] 
would be roughly equivalent to the man who owned a $45,000 house, drove a $5,000 car, 
but had less than a dollar in his bank account.”) (emphasis added). Penn Central was like 
a “proud but aging widow secretly selling off her jewelry and silver to keep up appearances, 
to keep the suitors knocking at her door.” Id. at 206. 
122 Despite a for-profit obligation, Amtrak officials are likely held to a presumption of 
good faith in execution of their duties. See CTIA—The Wirless Ass’n v. FCC, 530 F.3d 
984, 989 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“And we have long presumed that executive agency officials 
will discharge their duties in good faith.”) (citing Sprint Nextel Corp. v. FCC, 508 F.3d 
1129, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2007)); but cf. Alexander Volokh, Privatization and The Elusive 
Employee-Contractor Distinction, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 176-87 (2012) (arguing that 
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that it remained liquid. At the time of its bankruptcy, the Penn Central 
owed money to 100,000 creditors but only had $13 million cash on 
hand.123 With this history fresh in mind, Congress likely wanted to ensure 
that Amtrak would not run into the same issue as the Penn Central. 
Therefore, the for-profit obligation was not likely created to incentivze 
Amtrak to act in self-interest, but rather to protect the industry from 
devastating bankruptcies that were so cataclysmic that “the condition of 
American capitalism” was called into question.124  
Furthermore, Amtrak does not likely “compete” with freight 
operators. In a footnote in its 2016 order, the D.C. Circuit concluded that 
Amtrak is in competition with private freight railroads because—although 
they do not compete for passengers—they do compete for scarce resources 
(i.e. train track) essential to the operation of both kinds of rail service.125 
Yet there is no consensus among economists in defining the term 
“competition.”126 The lack of consensus may be attributed to the fact that 
“defining the market and defining competition are not the same.”127 The 
D.C. Circuit’s footnote acknowledges that Amtrak and the private freight 
operators compete for train track, but it does not assert that they compete 
for passengers or freights.128 However, whether Amtrak is in competiton 
with the freight operators largely depends on how the market is defined. If 
the market is defined by “railroad use,” then Amtrak and the private freight 
operators are likely in competition, but if the market is defined by 
“passenger rail service” or “freight operation service,” there is likely no 
competition between the two.   
The D.C. Circuit also implied in its footnote that Amtrak and the 
private railroad operators “compete” because they share the same railroad 
track,129 even though there is a view that rivalry should define economic 
competition.130 But does “rivalry” include competition over scarce 
 
the view that public employees’ motivations are bound by “official duty” is overly 
optimistic because they may in fact act selfishly or arbitrarily). 
123 See DAUGHEN & BINZEN, supra note 33, at 207. 
124 See id. at 12.  
125 Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. Dep’t of Transp., 821 F.3d 19, 34 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
126 Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Competition, 81 MISS. L.J. 107, 111 (2011). 
127 E. Thomas Sullivan, On Nonprice Competition: An Economic and Marketing 
Analysis, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 771, 774 (1984). 
128 See Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 821 F.3d at 34 n.1. 
129 Id. 
130 Stucke, supra note 126, at 114 (quoting STANLEY N. BARNES ET AL., THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 318 (1955) (“[O]ne 
conception of competition is ‘the self-interested and independent rivalry of two or more 
private competitors.’”)). Moreover, within the antitrust context, there are calls to 
permanently define competition by rivalry. Harry S. Gerla, Restoring Rivalry as a Central 
Concept in Antitrust Law, 75 NEB. L. REV. 209, 211 (1996) (“Rivalry as competition is 
sound economics because contemporary studies indicate that promoting rivalry will 
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resources? Merriam-Webster deifnes competition in terms of rivalry as 
“the effort of two or more parties acting independently to secure the 
business of a third party by offering the most favorable terms.”131 Indeed, 
even legal dictionaries espouse a rivalry theme in their definitions of 
competition by emphasizing competition for business from the same third 
parties rather than competition for scarce resources.132  
Under the rivalry definition of competition, the D.C. Circuit’s 
conclusion that Amtrak is self-interested is wrong because Amtrak and the 
freight operators do not “compete” for the same business from the same 
third parties.133 They share railroad track in order to serve different parties, 
and Amtrak’s proposed metrics and standards are designed to help it better 
service passengers, not the freight operators’ consumers.134 The metrics 
and standards it promulgates may burden freight operator’s administrative 
and financial costs, but that burden only occurs because of the agreements 
both parties are obliged by statute to sign.135  
That is not to say that Amtrak’s metrics and standards may affect the 
freight operators costs, but under the rivalry definition of competition the 
metrics and standards do not evidence competition between Amtrak and 
the freight operators because they are not vying for the same business from 
the same third parties. To conclude that Amtrak does compete with the 
freight operators—by virute of the metrics and standards indirectly 
affecting the freight operators’ costs—is to upend “eighty years of 
consistent definitional precedent” defining competition as rivalry.136 
B. Public/Private Status  
Even if the D.C. Circuit’s analysis of Amtrak was sufficiently 
comphrehenive, its choice to undergo that analysis was error because the 
 
increase the internal efficiency of firms, spur innovation, and help develop world-class 
competitive industries.”). 
131 Id. at 114 (quoting Competition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/competition (last visited Nov. 1, 2011)). 
132 Competition, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2011) (“[Defining ‘Competition’ 
as] the struggle for commercial advantage; the effort or action of two or more commercial 
interests to obtain the same business from third parties.”) (emphasis added). 
133 See Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 821 F.3d at 34 n.1. 
134 See Ass’n of American R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 135 S.Ct. 1225, 1230 (2015). 
135 Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–432, § 207(c), 122 Stat, 4848 
(2008). 
136 Gerla, supra note 130, at 212 (citing United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 
61, 89 (1912)); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 
1945); United States v. Koppers Co., 202 F. Supp. 437, 446-47 (W.D. Pa. 1962); United 
States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 168 F. Supp. 576, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); United States v. 
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 341 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 
(1954)).  
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Supreme Court previously held that Amtrak is a public entity.137 Under 
Carter Coal, public bodies are presumed disinterested.138 The Carter Coal 
presumption proves a more workable rule than the D.C. Circuit’s 2016 
analysis if the regulatory state is to function properly.139 This may explain 
why the D.C. Circuit, in the second round of appeals, chose not to affirm 
the lower court’s decision to invalidate all of Section 207 of the 2008 Rail 
Act. Doing so, as the D.C. Circuit was likely well-aware, would render 
any degree of delegated regulatory authority to market participants facially 
invalid as a violation of due process. In effect, this would overrule Carter 
Coal by declaring that private delegations of regulatory authority are 
outright unconstitutional, regardless of public or private status. By 
walking back the district court’s invalidation of Section 207 in its entirety, 
the D.C. Circuit’s 2018 order reflects this concern.140  
The D.C. Circuit chose only to remove the binding arbitration 
provision.141 This walk-back was clearly not based on fairness, as the court 
acknowledged that the constitutional problem was not that Amtrak 
exercised some role in formulating the proposed metrics and standards.142  
Alternatively, the D.C Circuit’s 2018 order was based on 
accountability.143 Amtrak could constitutionally exercise some measure of 
 
137 Ass’n of American R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 135 S.Ct. 1225, 1232–33 (2015); 
see also Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995) (holding that Amtrak 
is a public entity in the First Amendment context). However, the D.C. Circuit justified its 
choice to engage in a  self-interest inquiry of Amtrak by reasoning that the public/private 
distinction is unrelated to, and has no effect on, whether an entity is economically self-
interested or not. See Ass’n of American R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 821 F.3d 19, 32 
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[C]oncluding ‘Amtrak is not an autonomous private enterprise’ is not 
the same as concluding it is not economically self-interested.”) (citation omitted).  
138 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936). 
139 But see Ass’n of American R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 821 F.3d 19, 31 (D.C. Cir. 
2016) (citing Volokh, supra note 113 (“Wherever Amtrak may fall along the spectrum 
between public accountability and private self-interest, the ability—if it exists—to co-opt 
the state’s coercive power to impose a disadvantageous regulatory regime on its market 
competitors would be problematic.”)). 
140 The D.C. Circuit was also concerned with judicial restraint in constitutional 
adjudication. See Ass’n of American R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 896 F.3d 539, 549–
50 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (choosing to sever Section 207’s arbitration provision instead of 
affirming the District Court’s invalidation of the entire statute because severability is 
presumed in constitutional adjudication). 
141 See generally Ass’n of American R.Rs., 896 F.3d at 539 (severing Section 207’s 
binding arbitration provision—so as to eliminate Amtrak’s ability to exercise regulatory 
authority over the private freight operators without the FRA’s approval—as the proper 
constitutional remedy and upholding the constitutionality of the rest of the statute). 
142 Id. at 545. 
143 The D.C. Circuit was also concerned with accountability in an earlier stage of the 
case. See Ass’n of American R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 675 (D.C. Cir. 
2013); see also Volokh, supra note 113, at 972 (“One purpose [for the private-public 
distinction] is accountability: a private delegation dilutes democratic accountability, 
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regulatory authority “as long as [the FRA’s] duty to protect the ‘public 
good’ could check Amtrak’s self-interest and prevent unfair harm to its 
competitors.”144 By relying on accountability,145 the D.C. Circuit 
concluded that the “key” to curing the issue was simply eliminiating the 
arbitration provision.146 Therefore, Amtrak could still possess some degree 
of regulatory authority since the constitutuonal remedy did not require 
“completely walling Amtrak off from any role at all” in the regulatory 
process.147  
The D.C. Circuit’s decision is still concerning for other public entites, 
however, because the court still upheld the due process violation despite 
its remedial walk-back.148 Like Amtrak’s near-monopoly over public 
passenger rail service, the United States provides a statutory monopoly for 
mail through the United States Postal Service (“USPS”).149 Like private 
frieght operators, private market participants like FedEx and the United 
Parcel Service (“UPS”) are subject to USPS’s decisions. For example, 
USPS has the authority to shape the definition of the types of packages 
that can be included in its protected domain through size and weight 
restrictions.150 When USPS shapes that definition, it is not only 
determining the types of packages it may service, but also indirectly 
determining the types of packages that UPS and Fedex may not service. 
The final outcome of the American Railroads litigation is troubling 
because private competitors like UPS and Fedex may be able to challenge 
USPS’s ability to define its services based solely on the fact that its 
definitons indirectly affect their service capacity. Despite USPS’s 
constitutional status,151 private competitors would be equipped with a 
constitutional due process claim, which they could use to potentially 
paralyze USPS’s functions.  
That is not to say that USPS does not engage in any anti-competitive 
practices that may justify challenges from private market participants 
 
because when power is delegated to a private organization, the government is no longer 
blamed for the organization’s decisions.”). 
144 Ass’n of American R.Rs., 896 F.3d at 545 (quoting Ass’n of American R.Rs. v. Dep’t 
of Transp., 821 F.3d 19, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). 
145 Id. at 548 (“[T]he relevant constitutional question . . . is whether the Administration 
can ‘check’ Amtrak’s self-interests . . . [and] not whether it can speak for a different self-
interested group.”). 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 545, 548. 
148 See generally id. at 541. 
149 D. Daniel Sokol, Competition Policy and Comparative Corporate Governance of 
State-Owned Enterprises, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1713, 1772 (2009). 
150 Id. 
151 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. 
2019] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 241 
 
under applicable anti-trust laws.152 USPS retains other forms of authority 
that may affect private market participants, including the power of eminent 
domain and self-zoning.153 It also engages in cross-subsidization practices, 
which are considered anti-competitive.154 The issue resulting from 
American Railroads is that subjecting public institutions to constitutional 
challenges based on self-interested behavior may have the negative effect 
of undermining public confidence in governmental bodies,155 let alone 
styming their ability to regulate their target industries. 
The potential to undermine public confidence and paralyze 
functionality counsels strongly against elevating private market 
participants’ claims to constitutional status. After American Railroads, 
however, private competitors can challenge public entities’ authority 
without having to overcome state immunity under anti-trust law.156 Now, 
constitutional claims will be allowed where anti-trust claims may have 
 
152 See generally North Carolina State Bd. Of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494 
(2015) (Federal Trade Commission filed complaint alleging that the North Carolina State 
Board of Dental Examiners’ concerted action to exclude non-dentists from the market for 
whitening services in North Carolina constituted an anticompetitive and unfair method of 
competition under the federal Trade Commission Act). 
153 See Sokol, supra note 149. 
154 Mark B. Solomon, USPS, Rivals and Mailers Knock Heads over Alleged Cross-
Subsidy of Products, D.C. VELOCITY (Mar. 5, 2015) 
https://www.dcvelocity.com/articles/20150305-usps-rivals-and-mailers-knock-heads-
over-alleged-cross-subsidy-of-products (explaining cross-subsidization: when USPS does 
not “provide enough information about its costs to prove [that it] is covering each product’s 
expenses from its corresponding revenue stream . . . in effect, ‘robbing Peter to pay 
Paul.’”). However, there have been recent attempts to mitigate USPS’s anticompetitive 
behavior. The Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, 39 U.S.C § 409 (e) (1) (B) 
(2006) (subjecting the USPS to antitrust laws); 39 U.S.C § 3622 (b) (9) (2006) (attempting 
to curb USPS’ cross-subsidization behavior by creating the Postal Regulatory Commission, 
which requires allocation of “the total institutional costs of the Postal Service appropriately 
between market-dominant and competitive products.”). 
155 See John West & Michael Gruen, A Better Path for East Midtown, 23 CITY L. 25 
(2017) (explaining that public confidence is undermined when government is casted as a 
“self-interested marketer” rather than as a “disinterested arbiter seeking a balance among 
interests”); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Duty & The Death Penalty, 21 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 
26 (2015) (“[I]t is that fidelity to duty that makes our system of government both more 
legitimate and accountable. When public officials recognize their duty to fulfill their 
specific role and put that duty ahead of self-interest, they promote the 
public's confidence and respect in their government, and thus in its legitimacy.”). 
156 Under the “State Action” doctrine, regulation by the state is immune from antitrust 
liability. Volokh, supra note 113, at 984 (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. 
Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-41 
(1982)). However, because agencies tend to stretch the doctrine, depending on their degrees 
of privacy, they can be considered private even if they otherwise look public. Id.  
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otherwise sufficed.157 In effect, the D.C. Circuit’s holding seems to have 
heralded in a new constitutional anti-trust doctrine under the guise of due 
process. In theory, however, keeping due process and anti-trust doctrinally 
distinct is important, especially since the remedy for a successful 
constitutional claim is statutory invalidation or severability, whereas under 
an anti-trust claim the remedy is typically limited to treble damages.158 
To avoid these concerns, Carter Coal’s distinction between public and 
private status should govern. Constitutional challenges against Amtrak, 
USPS, and other public entites that simultaneously participate in and 
regulate a given market are better preserved under Carter Coal because it 
explicitly presumes that government entities are disinterested.159 Under 
this presumption, private market participants would be effectively barred 
from bringing anti-trust challenges clothed in constitutional claaims. In the 
long run, the small cost of subjecting private challengers to the state 
immunity doctrine under anti-trust law preserves public regulatory entites’ 
functionality and the public’s confidence in their neutrality. 
V. CONCLUSION: THE LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL 
Eventually, Chris Paul got what he wanted. On December 14, 2011, 
the Hornets dealt Paul to the Los Angeles Clippers in exchange for Eric 
Gordon, Chris Kama, Al-Faroug Aminu, and a first-round draft pick.160 
Commissioner Stern said that he never allowed other owners’ opinions or 
the consideration of other teams’ market size to influence where Paul 
would end up because his only focus was on getting the best deal for the 
Hornets.161 Hornets general manager Dell Demps was especially excited 
about the deal: 
"With this trade, we now have three additional players 
who were among the top eight draft picks in their 
respective drafts as well as our own first round pick and 
Minnesota's first round pick," Demps said in a statement 
released by the team. "Aminu is a young talent with a 
 
157 Id. at 984, 999 (explaining that an antitrust violation, once state action immunity is 
overcome, may be easier to prove because of “structural factors like the competitive 
relationship between the regulators and the regulated parties”).  
158 See generally Ass’n of American R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 896 F.3d 539 (D.C. 
Cir. 2018); see also id. at 984. 
159 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936). 
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bright future, Gordon is a big-time scorer and one of the 
best (shooting) guards in the league and Kaman is a 
proven center and former All-Star . . . We will field a 
competitive team and our future looks great."162 
On April 13, 2012, it was announced that Tom Benson, owner of the 
National Football League’s New Orleans Saints, purchased the Hornets 
from the NBA for $338 million.163 As of February 2019, the team is worth 
$1.2 billion.164 The NBA did its job.  
Amtrak’s story, on the other hand, has been anything but a fairy tale. 
Historically, it is an enterprise with negative net worth, unable to run itself 
in a business-like fashion.165 Indeed, it has a history of making often 
“appalling” decisions, such as opening a Wisconsin train line that often 
ran empty, losing more than a thousand dollars for each passenger it 
carried.166 However, much of Amtrak’s fiscally dubious decisions may be 
attributed to its statutory mandate to maintain nationwide service 
irrespective of profitability.167  
Still, despite the inefficienices stemming from its prior decisions and 
statutory requirements, there may still be proverbial light at the end of the 
 
162 Id.  
163 Saints owner Benson buys Hornets from NBA, NBA NEWS (Apr. 13, 2012), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20151117214948/http://www.nba.com/2012/news/04/13/hor
nets-sale.ap/index.html. 
164 New Orleans Pelicans, FORBES (last visited Dec. 14, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/teams/new-orleans-pelicans/#4f5674634c2e. 
165 VRANICH, supra note 78, at 8.  
166 Id. (citing Richard P. Jones, Amtrak to Serve Lake Geneva, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL 
(June 13, 2000) at 2B). Amtrak’s “chaotic” fiscal performance even had one of its own 
officers questioning its existence over twenty years ago. See Jackie Spinner, Amtrak’s CFO 
is Well Acquainted with Fiscal Chaos, WASH. POST (July 31, 1995), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1995/07/31/amtraks-cfo-is-well-
acquainted-with-fiscal-chaos/a61e549c-890d-460c-8f59-
47e18c7fcef8/?utm_term=.b43eeac8e227 (“I think there’s two questions: ‘What’s the 
future of passenger rail in America?’ There is a completely separate question, which is, 
‘What’s the future of Amtrak?’ You can imagine a brilliant future with passenger rail with 
Amtrak gone.). 
167 Amtrak has recently stated that it loses money on long-distance, cross-country routes. 
See Ted Mann, Amtrak, Seeking to Break Even, Sees Some Light at the End of the Tunnel, 
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tunnel for Amtrak.168 Various new improvements to its infrastructure 
alongside improved fiscal performance stand as reminders to Amtrak’s 
true, statutory purpose: the protection and revitilization of American 
passenger rail service, not competition against private freight operators. 
If public regulatory bodies are subjected to self-interest inquiries 
under due process challenges, statutory purpose and market history are 
critical to understanding their purpose and behavior. However, the 
implication of such challenges is that they elevate anti-trust theories to 
constitutional status at the expense of public regulators’ functionality and 
the public’s perception of their neutrality. Amtrak’s fate has been 
sealed,169 but the constitutional gate is now open. There will likely be more 
of these types of due process challenges going forward.170  
Despite the final outcome in American Railroads, other federal circuit 
courts should adopt the public-private distinction under Carter Coal 
instead of engaging in the D.C. Circuit’s self-interest analysis of public 
regulators. Under the Carter Coal regime, public entities with regulatory 
structures similar to Amtrak will not suffer the same fate. 
 
 
168 Id. (explaining that Amtrak is close to breaking even for the first time in its nearly 
fifty-year history as rising ridership and cost cuts continue a multi-year improvement in its 
financial performance). 
169 Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. Dep’t of Transp., 896 F.3d 539 (D.C. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 
139 S.Ct. 2665 (2019).  
170 USPS is certainly a potential target due to its anti-competitive practices. Sokol, supra 
note 149 (“[On USPS’ cross-subsidization practices:] An FTC report estimates that the 
value of government subsidies that the USPS allocates to competitive products by virtue 
of its government status to be in the range of $38 million to $113 million.”) (citing FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, Accounting for Laws that Apply Differently to the United States Postal 
Service and its Private Competitors 57 (2007), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/01/080116postal.pdf). 
